Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 47
Issue 3 Spring 2016

Article 5

2016

Confrontation's Convolutions
Christine Chambers Goodman

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Christine Chambers Goodman, Confrontation's Convolutions, 47 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 817 ().
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol47/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information, please
contact law-library@luc.edu.

PDF (DO NOT DELETE)

4/1/16 2:06 PM

Confrontation’s Convolutions
Christine Chambers Goodman*
Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts in the 2004 Crawford v.
Washington case to narrow the parameters of the Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation, lower courts vary widely in interpreting when the
Confrontation Clause applies. Subsequent 5–4 and 4–1–4 decisions of
the Court have raised more questions than answers, especially in the
context of expert testimony. In analyzing the decade of cases, this
Article finds that confusion abounds in three primary areas: (1) which
witnesses are actually witnesses against the accused, (2) whether the
evidence must be accusatory in order to be testimonial, or must be both
accusatorial and testimonial, and (3) whether and when testifying
experts may rely upon the reports of other non-testifying experts. The
Court has had many petitions for certiorari that would have provided
opportunities to clarify the scope of the doctrine as to such evidence as
autopsy reports, machine-generated data, and reports identifying
substances, samples, and DNA profiles, but accepted none involving
expert witness testimony. While the Ohio v. Clark decision in June
2015 provided some guidance on the first question of who counts as a
witness against the accused, there was little clarification on the
accusation issue, nor on any of the other issues involving expert
witnesses.
This Article explains the post-Crawford convolutions of
Confrontation Clause analysis, and identifies the remaining questions in
evaluating whether a statement is testimonial, with special focus on the
use of expert witness opinion testimony. Part IV concludes this Article
with modes of analysis for Confrontation Clause issues going forward.
Given the circuit splits on what counts as testimonial evidence in
various areas, this Article addresses three proposals: (1) to treat quasi* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; J.D. Stanford, A.B. cum laude
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percipient expert witnesses differently than other experts, (2) to
consider certain expert reports and other types of statements nontestimonial so that traditional hearsay exceptions will be adequate for
admission, and (3) to provide specifically tailored instructions for jury
trials involving non-disclosure of expert basis evidence. As long as the
Supreme Court declines petitions that provide opportunities to clarify
the scope and parameters of the right to confrontation, this Article
provides some guidance for lower courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s doctrine on the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause has been evolving since the turn of
the century. The primary purpose of the right to confront is to ensure
reliability by subjecting witnesses against an accused to crossexamination in an adversary proceeding.
That right has three
components: (1) the right to be present at trial, (2) the right to have
prosecution witnesses present at the trial, and the (3) right to crossexamine prosecution witnesses. The physical presence of prosecution
witnesses permits the jury to observe the demeanor and other body
language of the witnesses, which helps the jurors to evaluate credibility.
When the hearsay declarant is not present in a criminal trial, only the
person who is in court repeating the declarant’s out-of-court statement
can be cross-examined, and concerns about credibility and fairness are
enhanced.
While the 2004 Crawford case made an attempt to streamline
Confrontation Clause doctrine, limiting its applicability to “testimonial”
statements,1 the subsequent plurality and sharply divided 5–4 opinions
leave prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys (and law professors)
still wondering how to analyze expert witness testimony under the
Confrontation Clause. Part Two of this Article describes the evolution
of the doctrine, noting that these decisions have raised more questions
than answers, particularly in cases involving the use of expert evidence.
Litigants in lower courts sought such guidance through a number of
petitions for certiorari filed in the 2013–14 term. Those petitions
covered such areas as the limits of admissibility for autopsy reports,
machine-generated data, and reports identifying substances, samples,
and DNA profiles. Of the thirteen petitions for writ of certiorari raising
Confrontation Clause issues sent to the Court in the past three years,
only one was accepted, and it did not involve expert witness testimony.
The petition in Ohio v. Clark provided the opportunity to address
whether a teacher, as a mandatory reporter, is a state actor when
interviewing a child, and whether the child’s response to the teacher’s
inquiries constitutes a testimonial statement.2
1. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
2. On October 2, 2014, the Court finally granted a petition for certiorari in a case implicating
the Confrontation Clause in Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 43 (2014) (mem.). A jury convicted the
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Part Three analyzes the varied interpretations of the Confrontation
Clause doctrine in light of the Clark decision, and the remaining
questions as to whether a statement is testimonial, with special focus on
the use of expert witness testimony. Confusion abounds in three
primary areas: (1) which witnesses are deemed to be a witness against
the accused, (2) whether the evidence must be accusatory in order to be
testimonial, or must be both accusatorial and testimonial, and (3)
whether and when testifying experts may rely upon the reports of other
non-testifying experts in giving their opinions. While the Clark
decision provided some guidance on the first question of who counts as
a witness against the accused, it presented little clarification on the
accusation issue, or on any of the other issues involving expert
witnesses.
Part Four concludes this Article with modes of analysis for
Confrontation Clause issues going forward, making three proposals to
help untangle the mixture of approaches applied in various jurisdictions.
This Article does not take a position on whether the Confrontation
Clause protections should be expanded or contracted, but rather seeks to
make sense of the current Court’s doctrine.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE LAST DECADE’S EVOLUTION OF THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. Confrontation Clause Basics
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides the
accused with the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him”
in all criminal prosecutions.3 The clause ensures that any evidence
submitted against a criminal defendant during trial is subject to rigorous
testing, as the accused has the opportunity to cross-examine adverse
witnesses.4 This kind of face-to-face confrontation, although not an
absolute right, is considered a core value protected by the clause.5
1. Crawford Narrows Its Scope to “Testimonial” Statements
After a long history of cases limiting the scope of the right to

defendant, Clark, of felonious assault, child endangerment, and domestic violence. Clark
appealed his conviction arguing that the hearsay testimony admitted violated his right to
confrontation. An Ohio court of appeals reversed and remanded. The State appealed, and the
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed in a 4–3 opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court decision is discussed in
Part II below. See also infra notes 15–29, 33–34, 36–38 and accompanying text.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. Sarah K. Eddy, Sixth Amendment at Trial, 90 GEO. L.J. 1708 (2002).
5. Id.
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confront witnesses against the accused, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Confrontation Clause requirements apply only in
situations where the hearsay evidence that the prosecution seeks to
admit is categorized as a “testimonial” statement.6 If the statement is
not testimonial, then the prosecution simply must satisfy the elements of
the pertinent hearsay exception, and the statement will be admissible.7
If the statement is testimonial but the declarant who made the
“testimonial” statement outside of court is produced to testify in court,
then there is no Confrontation Clause violation for admitting the
hearsay statement because the declarant can be cross-examined about
the statement under oath.8 However, if the statement is testimonial, but
the declarant is not produced, then the declarant must be proven to be
unavailable by a preponderance of evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(a), and the accused must have had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine that declarant about that statement.9
Otherwise,
admitting the hearsay statement against the criminal defendant violates
the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.10
So, how does one determine whether a statement is testimonial? The
Crawford case declined to provide a comprehensive definition, but said
that at a minimum, it includes “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, or at a former trial, and police interrogations.”11
Subsequent cases have provided more substance to this definition,
applying the “primary purpose” test. Where the primary purpose of the
conversation or interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, then the statement will
be considered testimonial, unless it is in response to an ongoing
emergency.12

6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (2004) (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.”).
7. See Id. (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law . . . .”).
8. See Id. at 59 n.9 (2004) (“[W]e reiterate that, when the declarant appears for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior
testimonial statements.”).
9. See id. at 59 (“Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding:
Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine.”).
10. Id. (holding that testimonial statements of an unavailable witness violates the
Confrontation Clause unless there is a prior opportunity for cross-examination).
11. Id. at 68.
12. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 814 (2006):
[S]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under
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One researcher performed a statistical analysis of statements
determined by lower courts post-Crawford to be testimonial and those
that were not, and reached the following conclusion:
First, state action matters. A lot. A given statement is almost twice as
likely to be found to be testimonial, all else equal, when it is made to a
state actor. The fact that the recipient of a statement is either a police
officer or a nonpolice government official (for example, a fire
marshal, prosecutor, or judge) substantially increases the likelihood
that a court will find that statement to be testimonial.13

Keenan’s research notes that other statistics are more ambiguous,
such as statements made to health care professionals, in part because of
the variety of situations in which they operate. This variety includes
everything from medical emergencies to child witness interviews
conducted by social workers in suspected abuse cases, with the latter
being seen as a “means to collect evidence” and “the interviews
sometimes occur[ing] at the instigation of the police.”14 The Court
recently addressed this child abuse witness issue in Ohio v. Clark,
which is discussed in the next Section.
2. Ohio v. Clark Reaffirms the Primary Purpose Test
The central issue in Ohio v. Clark was whether a child’s out-of-court
statements to his teachers in response to the teachers’ concerns about
possible child abuse rose to the level of “testimonial” statements subject
to the Confrontation Clause.15 Following an investigation by the local
child services department, a physician examined the injured child and

circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Id.; see also Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011) (further defining what constitutes a
testimonial statement).
13. Dylan O. Keenan, Note, Confronting Crawford v. Washington in the Lower Courts, 122
YALE L.J. 782, 821 (2012). He continues:
Second, some of the results are quite consistent with Davis’s emphasis on emergency
response. For example, statements made during a crime—in the midst of an
emergency with uncertain outcomes—are slightly less likely to be found to be
testimonial. The same is true of statements held to be excited utterances and those
made while a party is injured.
Id. at 822. For instance, he notes that “statements made during 911 calls are forty percent more
likely to be testimonial,” which makes sense because the 911 operator is a state actor, especially
when one controls for the fact that most 911 calls involve emergencies. Id. at 823.
14. Id.
15. See Ohio v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 598 (Ohio 2013) (expanding upon the primary
purpose test).
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determined that the child’s injuries had occurred sometime between the
day of the examination and the preceding month.16 Teachers testified as
to what the child had said in identifying the defendant as the abuser.17
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that admitting the child’s statements to
his teachers violated the defendant’s confrontation rights.18
On petition for certiorari, the State of Ohio argued that the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s decision conflicted with other cases containing
“identical arguments [based] on similar facts.”19 The petition further
noted that the child’s statements were not made for the purposes of
evading confrontation, and as such, did not violate the defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights.20 The State requested that the United
States Supreme Court address the reoccurring question of when
statements to private individuals qualify as testimonial under the
Confrontation Clause.21
The two issues presented were: (1) whether an individual who is
subject to a mandatory reporting duty becomes an agent of law
enforcement for Confrontation Clause purposes, and (2) whether a
child’s hearsay statement made to a teacher inquiring about possible
child abuse is “testimonial” and thus subject to the Confrontation
Clause.22 The Court determined that teachers did not become state
actors simply by virtue of mandatory reporting statutes, and that the
intent of the declarant, the child in this case, is the proper perspective
from which to evaluate the primary purpose of the out-of-court

16. Id. at 595.
17. State v. Clark, No. 96207, 2011 WL 6780456, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2011).
“Ramona Whitley, who was [the child’s] assistant preschool teacher at the time the abuse was
discovered, testified that . . . when she asked [the child] what happened . . . he gave three different
answers: that he fell; that he did not know; and that ‘Dee did it.’” Id. The other teacher, Debra
Jones, testified that when she asked the student what happened “he almost looked uncertain, but
he said, Dee did it.” Id.
18. Clark, 999 N.E.2d at 600.
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (No. 13-1352)
[hereinafter Petition for Certiorari, Clark] (“[C]ourts in other jurisdictions . . . have held that the
mere fact of a declarant making a hearsay statement to a statutorily defined mandatory reporter
does not make the statement testimonial.”).
20. Id. at 28. The petitioner, the State of Ohio, argued that “the absence of evidence
suggesting an attempt to evade the requirements of the Confrontation Clause allows the Court to
focus narrowly on the questions of what effect a mandatory-reporting obligation has under the
Sixth Amendment and of how statements to non-law enforcement should be treated under the
amendment.” Id. at 28–29.
21. Id. at 12. The petitioner argued that “the Court’s review is sorely needed because its prior
cases leave lower courts with little guidance on the method to resolve the recurring and important
question presented by this case . . . .” Id.
22. Clark, 999 N.E.2d at 600.
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statement.23 Where the primary purpose as intended by the declarant is
not to substitute for trial testimony, the statement is not testimonial.24
The Court found that a three-year-old child could not understand the
criminal justice system and, therefore, could not have a primary purpose
of creating testimony for a criminal trial.25 The Clark Court further
determined that ascertaining whether the crime of child abuse had
occurred and, if so, the identity of the perpetrator was a response to an
ongoing emergency, and thus outside the realm of testimonial
statements.26
In Clark, the Court reinforced the primary purpose test: “[W]e ask
whether a statement was given with the ‘primary purpose of creating an
out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’”27 However, the Clark
majority deflated this primary purpose test by stating that it is
“necessary, but not always sufficient.”28 Instead, the Court pronounced
that courts “must evaluate the challenged statement in context, and part
of that context is the questioner’s identity.”29
In evaluating the primary purpose, one factor has been whether the
circumstances indicate solemnity30 and formality31 similar to that for
testimony. The statement must be an “out of court analog, in purpose
and in form,” to in-court testimony. Also, the possibility of sanctions
for lying adds formality.32 In Clark, the Court upheld the solemnity and
formality factors and found that the conversation between the child and
preschool teachers was “informal and spontaneous” and thus did not
satisfy the solemnity or formality prongs.33 Conversely, statements
made while in police custody or in response to police interrogation, or
even just conversations with the police, can be sufficiently solemn or

23. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181–83.
24. Id. at 2181–82.
25. Id. at 2182.
26. Id. at 2181.
27. Id. at 2183 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011)).
28. Id. at 2180–81. But see id. at 2184–85 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“That is
absolutely false, and has no support in our opinions.”).
29. Id. at 2182 (majority opinion).
30. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (defining testimony as “[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact”).
31. Id. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”).
32. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826, 830 n.5 (2006) (stating that “[t]he solemnity of
even an oral declaration of a relevant past fact to an investigating officer is well enough
established by the severe consequences that can attend a deliberate falsehood,” and “[i]t imports
sufficient formality, in our view, that lies to such [police] officers are criminal offenses”).
33. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
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formal.34 Clark determined that, while teachers may be required to
inquire into and report suspected child abuse by questioning children,
such conversations are not treated as though they were official
interrogations by law enforcement.
Another factor courts have considered is that statements made under
circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the
statement would be available for later use at trial were more likely to be
testimonial.35 In Clark, while the teachers had a reasonable belief that
their questions and the child’s answers would be for later use at trial, the
Court found that their primary purpose was to protect the child and
“remove him from harm’s way,”36 because the teachers would have
“acted with the same purpose whether or not they had a state law duty
to report abuse.”37 Stating that it is “irrelevant that the teachers’
questions [about potential child abuse] and their duty to report the
matter had the natural tendency to result in [the defendant’s]
prosecution,” the Court suggested that the reasonable-belief factor no
longer matters.38
3. Which Statements Are Not Testimonial?
Several categories of statements are deemed not to be testimonial.
For instance, statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy are not
testimonial because co-conspirators do not make statements to one
another with a reasonable belief that their statements will be used at
trial.39 Statements in business records generally are not testimonial,40
but if the “business” is a governmental law enforcement agency, then
the primary purpose for the communication will have to be analyzed to
determine whether the statement falls outside of the testimonial
definition.41

34. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. “Whatever else the term [testimonial] covers, it applies at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and
to police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed.” Id.
35. Id. at 52 (describing one formulation of testimonial statements, as referenced within an
amicus brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and others, as “statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial”).
36. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182–83.
37. Id. at 2183.
38. Id.
39. For further discussion, see Michael L. Seigel and Daniel Weisman, The Admissibility of
Co-Conspirator Statements In A Post-Crawford World, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 877 (2007).
40. For futher discussion, see Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause,
92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1904–09 (2012).
41. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819, 829–30 (2006). In Davis, statements made by an

PDF (DO NOT DELETE)

826

4/1/16 2:06 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 47

In a similar vein, the Court has been consistent in holding that
statements made with the purpose of dealing with an ongoing
emergency are not testimonial. In Clark, the Court determined that the
child’s statement to a teacher about potential child abuse was an
ongoing emergency.42 The Clark Court also seemed to add an intent
requirement, analyzing the primary purpose as intended by the
declarant, rather than the interrogator, without citation to authority.43
Until Clark, the Court had declined to address whether statements to
non-law enforcement personnel were testimonial.44
Now, such
statements are “much less likely to be testimonial,” if made to people
who are not principally charged with “uncovering and prosecuting
criminal behavior.”45 Still, the Court avoided a broader rule, stating,
“we decline to adopt a rule that statements to individuals who are not
law enforcement officers are categorically outside the Sixth
Amendment.”46
4. Which Expert is a Witness?: Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming
Guidance on who counts as a prosecution witness against the accused
evolved slightly in 2009 when the Supreme Court decided the
Melendez-Diaz case in a 5–4 split.47 Melendez-Diaz involved notarized
affidavits stating that analysts performed tests and concluded that a
certain substance recovered from the defendant was cocaine.48 The
Court held that the affidavits from the analysts were testimonial
statements, and that the analysts were “witnesses” for Confrontation
Clause purposes.49 The Melendez-Diaz dissenters argued that the
individual to government law enforcement agents were found to be testimonial because her
“statements deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning, how potentially criminal
past events began and progressed.” Id. at 830. The Court also determined that the individual
understood she was assisting the officers with a criminal investigation and concluded that
“[o]bjectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to
investigate a possible crime.” Id.
42. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181 (noting that the communications between the child and the
teacher were “informal and spontaneous”).
43. Id. at 2182 (“[I]t is extremely unlikely that a 3-year-old child in [his] position would
intend his statement to be a substitute for trial testimony.”).
44. Id. at 2180.
45. Id. at 2181, 2182.
46. Id. at 2182.
47. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009) (finding that the analysts’
certificates of analysis were affidavits within a class of testimonial statements covered by the
Confrontation Clause).
48. Id. at 307. “The affidavits submitted by the analysts contained only the bare-bones
statement that ‘[t]he substance was found to contain: Cocaine.’” Id. at 320.
49. Id. at 311 (“[U]nder our decision in Crawford the analysts’ affidavits were testimonial
statements, and the analysts were witnesses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Absent a
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affidavits were “near-contemporaneous observations of the test” and
therefore should not be considered testimonial,50 but the majority
rejected this argument because the affidavits were completed more than
a week after the tests were performed.51 Thus, it seemed that going
forward, the timing of the creation of the hearsay statement might play a
role in deciding whether the statement is testimonial.
Then in 2011, the Court decided Bullcoming, which involved a trial
conducted prior to the Court’s issuance of the Melendez-Diaz
decision.52 In Bullcoming, the primary evidence against the defendant
was a forensic laboratory report certifying the results of a test showing
his blood-alcohol content exceeded the threshold for a charge of
aggravated driving while intoxicated.53 The defendant’s blood sample
had been tested at the New Mexico Department of Health by a forensic
analyst who did not testify at trial.54 At trial, the State called another
analyst who was familiar with the testing device used and with the
laboratory’s testing procedures, but had neither participated in nor
observed the test on that particular blood sample.55 The Court held that
the report was testimonial.56
The Bullcoming Court reasoned that the certification reported more
than a machine-generated number: it represented that the analyst
received the
sample intact with the seal unbroken; that he checked to make
showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that [the defendant] had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine them, [the defendant] was entitled to ‘be confronted with’ the
analysts at trial.” (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004))).
50. Id. at 345 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“First, a conventional witness recalls events observed
in the past, while an analyst’s report contains near-contemporaneous observations of the test.”).
51. Id. at 315 (“It is doubtful that the analyst’s reports in this case could be characterized as
reporting near-contemporaneous observations; the affidavits were completed almost a week after
the tests were performed.”).
52. See generally Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
53. Id. at 2707.
54. Id. (“Bullcoming’s blood sample had been tested at the New Mexico Department of
Health, Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD), by a forensic analyst named Caylor, who
completed, signed, and certified the report. However, the prosecution neither called Caylor to
testify nor asserted he was unavailable; the record showed only that Caylor was placed on unpaid
leave for an undisclosed reason.”).
55. Id. (“In lieu of Caylor, the State called another analyst, Razatos, to validate the report.
Razatos was familiar with the testing device used to analyze Bullcoming’s blood and with the
laboratory’s testing procedures, but had neither participated in nor observed the test on
Bullcoming’s blood sample.”).
56. Id. at 2717 (finding that Melendez-Diaz precluded the State’s argument that introducing
the expert report did not implicate the Confrontation Clause because the report was undoubtedly
an “affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact” in a criminal
proceeding, created solely for an “evidentiary purpose,” and thus it was testimonial (citing
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311)).
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sure that the forensic report number and the sample number
corresponded; that he performed a particular test and adhered to
a precise protocol; and that he left the report’s remarks section
blank, indicating that no circumstance or condition affected the
sample’s integrity or the analysis’ validity.57
These representations, relating to past events and human actions not
revealed in raw, machine-produced data, were ripe for crossexamination and the failure to produce the testing analyst (absent a
showing of unavailability and prior opportunity for cross-examination),
violated the Confrontation Clause.58
The Court noted that the comparative reliability of an analyst’s
testimonial report does not dispense with the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause.59 The analysts who write reports introduced as
evidence must be made available for confrontation even if they have
“the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother
Teresa.”60 More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause does not
tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes
that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements
provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.61 Although
the purpose of Sixth Amendment rights is to ensure a fair trial, it does
not follow that such rights can be disregarded because, on the whole,
the trial was fair.62
5. When the Expert Report Is Not Offered for Its Truth: Williams
In 2012, in another divided plurality opinion, the Court revisited the
Confrontation Clause doctrine on expert witness reports.63 At the
petitioner’s bench trial for rape, the forensic specialist testified that she
matched a DNA profile that had been produced by an outside laboratory
57. Id. at 2714.
58. Id. at 2708.
59. Id. at 2715 (citing to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)); see also
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the
adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability. It thus replaces the
constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one. In this
respect, it is very different from exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that make no claim to be
a surrogate means of assessing reliability.”).
60. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319, n.6).
61. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318–19. In Melendez-Diaz, the Court reinforced the
notion that the Confrontation Clause’s “ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence.” Id. at
317–18 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–62). The Court rejected the notion of straying from
confrontation, stating that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously
reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.” Id. (quoting
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–62).
62. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006).
63. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (plurality opinion).
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to a sample of petitioner’s blood that her lab had processed.64 No one
from the outside lab testified. Swabs taken from the victim had been
sent to an outside lab, and a DNA profile was returned to her lab.65 The
trial court admitted the DNA profile evidence over the defense’s
Confrontation Clause objection.66
The Supreme Court affirmed
admitting the profile evidence, reasoning that, because the outside lab
report was used for the limited purpose of determining whether that
sample matched another sample, it was not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted.67 The implication of this ruling is that if the evidence is
not offered as hearsay, then there is no Confrontation Clause concern.
The lower courts’ adoption of the “basis as non-truth” portion of the
Williams plurality opinion has further constricted the effectiveness of
the right to confrontation. Subsequent petitions for certiorari have
criticized this ruling as adding confusion to the issue of whether and
when surrogate expert testimony violates the Confrontation Clause.68
The Williams plurality added that even if the evidence had been
offered for the truth of the matter asserted and thus was hearsay,
because the primary purpose of the report was to catch a dangerous
rapist who was still at large, rather than to accuse a targeted individual
(as occurred in the other cases), there was no incentive to fabricate to
64. Id. at 2227, 2235. Sandra Lambatos, a forensic specialist at the Illinois State Police Lab,
did not testify to the truth of any matter concerning Cellmark, an outside laboratory. Id. at 2235.
At no point did she reference the outside laboratory’s report—a report that was neither admitted
into evidence, nor seen by the trier of fact. Id. Additionally, Lambatos did not testify about the
work, or quality of work, done at the Cellmark Lab. Id. In Williams, the purpose of disclosing
the facts on which the expert relied was not to prove the truth of the underlying facts, but, rather,
the purposes were to show that the expert’s reasoning was not illogical and that the expert’s
opinion did not “depend on factual premises unsupported by other evidence in the record.” Id. at
2240; see also id. at 2227 (“In petitioner’s bench trial for rape, the prosecution called an expert
who testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory, Cellmark, matched a profile
produced by the state police lab using a sample of petitioner’s blood.”).
65. Id. at 2227 (“The expert also explained the notations on documents admitted as business
records, stating that, according to the records, vaginal swabs taken from the victim were sent to
and received back from Cellmark.”).
66. Id. at 2231 (“When Lambatos finished testifying, the defense moved to exclude her
testimony ‘with regards to testing done by [Cellmark]’ based on the Confrontation Clause. . . .
The trial judge agreed with the prosecution and stated that ‘the issue is . . . what weight do you
give the test, not do you exclude it.’ Accordingly, the judge stated that he would not exclude
Lambatos’ testimony, which was ‘based on her own independent testing of the data received from
[Cellmark].’” (alterations in original)).
67. Id. at 2240 (“In this case, the Cellmark report was not introduced into evidence. An expert
witness referred to the report not to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the report, i.e., that
the report contained an accurate profile of the perpetrator’s DNA, but only to establish that the
report contained a DNA profile that matched the DNA profile deduced from petitioner’s blood.
Thus, just as in Street, the report was not to be considered for its truth but only for the ‘distinctive
and limited purpose’ of seeing whether it matched something else.”).
68. See infra notes 72–122 and accompanying text.
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find a match, and thus there was no Confrontation Clause violation.69
This case has sparked controversy over what constitutes hearsay and
what satisfies the primary purpose test, and it has been the subject of
other law review articles.70 Part III discusses an alternative approach
that renders that statement not testimonial.71 The next Section
addresses the issues raised in the recent rejected petitions for certiorari.
B. The Court’s Missed Opportunities to Clarify the Doctrine: Petitions
in 2013–14
Thirteen petitions for certiorari were submitted to the United States
Supreme Court raising Confrontation Clause issues during the 2013–
2014 term. The Court accepted one petition in the fall of 2014, which
was heard during the 2014–15 term. The Court denied all of the other
petitions, many of which raised important ambiguities and splits of
authorities in the areas of autopsy reports, machine-generated data, and
whether a substance or sample is being analyzed for drug or alcohol
content or a DNA profile is being identified or matched. Most of the
cases involved experts who testified although they did not perform the
tests on the substances or samples, and many of those testifying experts
relied upon the testing expert’s work in reaching their conclusions.
These cases are categorized and described below.

69. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243–44.
Here, the primary purpose of the Cellmark report, viewed objectively, was not to
accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial. When the ISP lab sent the
sample to Cellmark, its primary purpose was to catch a dangerous rapist who was still
at large, not to obtain evidence for use against petitioner, who was neither in custody
nor under suspicion at that time. Similarly, no one at Cellmark could have possibly
known that the profile that it produced would turn out to inculpate petitioner—or for
that matter, anyone else whose DNA profile was in a law enforcement database. Under
these circumstances, there was no ‘prospect of fabrication’ and no incentive to produce
anything other than a scientifically sound and reliable profile.
Id.
70. See Jennifer R. Varon, A Powerless Plurality: The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
U.S. v. James Correctly Determined That The Plurality Opinion In Williams v. Illinois Lacks
Precedential Value, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 193 (2013) (discussing how the rationale in the
Williams decision was not supported by five Justices and therefore lacked precedential value);
Alexander J. Toney, The Credibility-Based Evaluative Purpose: Why Rule 703 Disclosures Don’t
Offend The Confrontation Clause, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 953 (2015) (where the author
discusses the confusion caused by the Williams decision and why the Supreme Court will likely
have to revisit the issues raised in Williams); Paul F. Rothstein, Unwrapping The Box The
Supreme Court Justices Have Gotten Themselves Into: Internal Confrontations Over Confronting
The Confrontation Clause, 58 HOW. L.J. 479 (2015) (discussing the complications in the
Williams decision, particularly concerning the lack of unity of the Supreme Court Justices).
71. See infra notes 123–164 and accompanying text.
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1. Autopsy Reports
One petition involved the split in authority as to whether autopsy
reports are testimonial. Edwards v. California considered an autopsy
report and testimony by a pathologist who did not perform the
autopsy.72 By distinguishing between objective facts and conclusive
opinions in the report, the Supreme Court of California found that the
autopsy report was not testimonial.73 The petition for certiorari noted
that state and federal courts were split on whether and when autopsy
reports are testimonial, and the distinction made by the California high
court was unworkable and confusing.74
2. Machine-Generated Data
The Court had several opportunities to review cases involving the
admissibility of machine-generated data when lower courts determined
that the data was not hearsay. In Arauz v. California, a California Court
of Appeal found that a machine-generated DNA report, which was part
of a rape kit, was not testimonial because it was not sufficiently
formal,75 nor did it target a known individual,76 nor was it hearsay as a
machine generated it.77 This case presented a chance to provide
guidance for situations in which the non-testing expert had personally
analyzed the DNA profiles about which the testifying expert testified,78

72. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Edwards v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2662 (2014) (No. 138618) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari, Edwards]; see People v. Edwards, 306 P.3d 1049, 1088
(Cal. 2013) (noting that autopsy reports typically contain statements that either describe “the
[autopsy] pathologist’s anatomical and physiological observations about the condition of the
body,” or those that “set forth the [autopsy] pathologist’s conclusions as to the cause of the
victim’s death”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2662 (2014). The Supreme Court of California further
recognized that an autopsy report contains both observations and conclusions, and that the
conclusions regarding the cause of death were considered to be formal and solemn but the
observations were not. Id. at 1089.
73. Id. at 1089.
74. Petition for Certiorari, Edwards, supra note 72, at 13.
75. People v. Arauz, No. B242843, 2013 WL 3357931, at *4–5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2664 (2014). The court noted that there was no explicit reference to court rules
and there was no notarization of the report, stating that the report and notification that formed the
basis of the testifying expert’s testimony lacked the “requisite degree of formality or solemnity”
to qualify as testimonial. Id. at *4.
76. Id. The court found that the DNA report was not created with the primary purpose of
targeting an accused individual because there was no particular suspect known at the time. Id.
Additionally, the court held that the DNA report was not testimonial because the defendant was
not a suspect at the time that the report was produced. Id.
77. Id. at *5 (“Our Supreme Court held that machine-generated printouts of blood alcohol
analyses do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.” (citing People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 478
(Cal. 2012))).
78. The DNA report was referred to in the testimony, and data created by another expert was
not admitted into evidence. Arauz, 2013 WL 3357931, at 5 (“[The testifying DNA analyst] did
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but the court denied certiorari.79
Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina involved a test for cocaine and also
exposed the ambiguity in the reasoning of the Williams plurality.80 The
issue for certiorari was again whether an expert who did not observe or
participate in the forensic testing could testify at trial analyzing the
results of another expert’s work.81 The petition for certiorari requested
that the Supreme Court clarify whether a report is testimonial when it is
based in whole, or in substantial part, on the analysis and opinion of an
out-of-court expert who did not testify.82
The petition further
emphasized the issue of juror confusion.83
In another case involving machine-based data and surrogacy, United
States v. Maxwell, the issue was whether the testifying expert’s reliance
on a non-testifying expert’s data in reaching her own conclusion
violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.84 The petition
cited a “deep split in authority” with two circuits and six state high
courts on one side.85 The Seventh Circuit held that the testifying expert

not testify to what some other analyst concluded. Instead, [the analyst] testified she personally
analyzed the DNA profiles. Her conclusions were based on her own analysis.”).
79. Arauz v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2664 (2014) (mem.) (denying certiorari).
80. State v. Ortiz-Zape, 743 S.E.2d 156, 157 (N.C. 2013). Based upon independent analysis
of testing performed by another analyst in her laboratory, an expert in forensic science testified
that the substance was cocaine. Id.
Defendant argues that, because [the testifying expert] did not test the substance at issue
herself or personally observe any testing, she could form no independent opinion
regarding the identity of the substance, and thus admission of her opinion identifying
the substance as cocaine violated defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.
The State argues that there was no Confrontation Clause violation because the expert
testified to her own opinion about the identity of the substance.
Id. at 159. The North Carolina Supreme Court found no Confrontation Clause violation, holding
that “when an expert gives an opinion, the expert is the witness whom the defendant has the right
to confront” and “[w]e believe our prior holding on this issue is consistent with this conclusion.”
Id. at 161.
81. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014)
(No. 13-633), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (mem.).
82. Id. at 11. After highlighting the confusion amongst the lower courts regarding when an
expert is allowed to base her opinions on analyses performed by others, the petitioner presented
the Court “with an opportunity to resolve the issue that this Court determined was worthy of
certiorari in Williams v. Illinois. Id. at 10–13.
83. Id. at 16. The petitioner contended that the plurality’s reasoning in the lower court’s
decision rested on the assumption that “a trial judge would not be confused about what may be
considered as substantive evidence when an expert testifies regarding forensic analysis performed
by another and not observed by the testifying expert,” and further argued that the plurality’s
reasoning would fall flat if applied in a criminal proceeding. Id.
84. See United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2660 (2014) (mem.).
85. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Maxwell v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (No.
13-7394) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari, Maxwell].
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made her own independent conclusion based upon the laboratory test
results and reports of another analyst,86 even though she did not conduct
the tests,87 and the testing analyst’s report was not introduced into
evidence.88 The Seventh Circuit also held that raw machine data does
not implicate a Confrontation Clause violation.89 In his petition for
certiorari, Maxwell argued that the Seventh Circuit’s decision is not
helpful to weed out fraudulent as well as incompetent analysts, thus
frustrating one purpose of providing criminal defendants a right to
confront.90
3. Identifying Substances and Samples
Marshall v. Colorado centered on the analysis of a urine sample to
determine whether the accused had been under the influence of
amphetamine and methamphetamine.91 The underlying issue for
certiorari was the split in authority over whether the testimony of the
laboratory analyst’s supervisor regarding the results of the defendant’s
urinalysis violated the defendant’s right to confrontation,92 and whether
86. Maxwell, 724 F.3d at 725. A forensic scientist in the Controlled Substances Unit at the
Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory analyzed the substance seized by a detective. Id. In doing so,
the forensic scientist memorialized his findings in a report that confirmed the presence of crack
cocaine. Id. Because this initial forensic scientist had already retired by the time of Maxwell’s
trial, the government called a second forensic scientist from the same lab to take his place. Id.
87. Id. at 725–26. The second forensic scientist testified that the substance confiscated from
Maxwell did contain cocaine. Id. at 725. Further, the second forensic scientist explained that, in
coming to his conclusion, she did not perform the “primary analysis” of the substance, but rather
reviewed the raw data from the tests performed by the initial forensic scientist. Id. at 725–26.
88. Id. at 727. The second forensic scientist did not read anything from the initial forensic
scientist’s reports into evidence during her testimony. Id. Additionally, the government did not
introduce into evidence the initial forensic scientist’s report or any readings from the instruments
he used during testing. Id.
89. Id. at 726–27 (“[R]aw data from a lab test are not ‘statements’ in any way that violates the
Confrontation Clause.”).
90. Petition for Certiorari, Maxwell, supra note 85, at 9. The petitioner argued that the
Seventh Circuit’s decision undermined one of the main purposes of the Confrontation Clause—to
ensure reliability of evidence by “testing in the crucible of cross-examination.” Id. Petitioner
further argued that the Seventh Circuit’s decision improperly allows prosecutors to circumvent
the Confrontation Clause by depriving defendants “of the principal means provided by the
Constitution for rooting out such erroneous statements.” Id. at 20.
91. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–17, Marshall v. Colorado, 134 S. Ct. 2661 (2014) (No.
13-7768) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari, Marshall].
After lab urinalysis revealed
methamphetamine in her system, the petitioner was charged with driving under the influence of
drugs, careless driving, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Marshall v. People, 309 P.3d 943,
943 (Colo. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2661 (2014) (mem.). Though the testifying analyst did
not personally test any of the samples, she did sign that the samples were tested correctly at that
time. Id. at 945.
92. See id. at 946. The technician supervisor testified about the methods used by all of the
technicians and indicated that, upon completion of the tests, she would review the packet of
information provided by each technician.
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the Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling conflicted with the United States
Supreme Court’s rulings in Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz.93 The
Colorado Supreme Court found that the technician supervisor’s use of
the language “approved by,” when affixing her signature to the
completed reports,94 was tantamount to certifying, and therefore
satisfied the requirements of Bullcoming and did not violate the
Confrontation Clause.95
Another case, Brewington v. North Carolina, involved the use of a
testing kit to determine whether a substance was cocaine,96 and the
central issue was over surrogate testimony—specifically whether the
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial
court allowed a non-testing supervising analyst to testify based solely
on the notes of a second analyst.97 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina found that it was permissible for the testifying analyst to tell
the jury the conclusions of another non-testifying analyst where those
conclusions had been presented in a testimonial forensic report, as long
as the testifying expert offered an independent opinion that she agreed
with the conclusion of the non-testifying expert’s notes and reports
based on her own individual analysis.98
The arguments for granting certiorari were that allowing this
testimony would bolster the credibility of the testifying expert while
insulating the basis evidence from any criticism, given that the basis for

93. Petition for Certiorari, Marshall, supra note 91, at 24–28 (criticizing the “supervisor
exception” to the Confrontation Clause).
94. Marshall, 309 P.3d at 948. Although the screening and confirmation tests were initially
performed by two other analysts, the technician supervisor’s “expertise was required to generate
the final report.” Id. Without the supervisor’s review, the results could not have been certified as
being accurate and mailed to the police department. Id. As a result, the Colorado Supreme Court
concluded that the supervisor’s involvement was the “final and necessary step” needed before the
results could be certified, signed, and returned to the requesting police department. Id.
95. Id. at 947 (“[W]hen a lab supervisor . . . independently reviews scientific data, draws
conclusions that the data indicates the positive presence of methamphetamine, and signs a report
to that effect that is admitted at trial, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied if she testifies and is
available for cross-examination.” (emphasis added)).
96. State v. Brewington, 743 S.E.2d 626, 627 (N.C. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2660
(2014) (mem.). In Brewington, the substance was transported to the North Carolina State Bureau
of Investigation, where it was then analyzed by the Assistant Supervisor in Charge. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 627–28. The Supreme Court of North Carolina determined that the opinion of an
expert is “substantive evidence,” making the expert the “witness whom the defendant has the
right to confront.” Id. The Supreme Court of North Carolina also noted that expert witnesses are
permitted to base their opinions on “otherwise inadmissible facts or data.” Id. at 628. The lab
notes of the non-testifying expert were not admitted into evidence. Id. Rather, the testifying
expert formed her own independent opinion after analyzing the non-testifying expert’s lab notes.
Id. at 628.
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that expert’s opinion was from a non-testifying expert report.99 Further,
the petitioner suggested that it would undercut the rationale of the
Bullcoming case if all one needs to do is to review someone else’s
report and testify to having reached an independent conclusion.100 As
set forth in the petition, allowing such testimony detracts from the
adversarial process of the litigation, and therefore should be found to
violate the Confrontation Clause.101
Also considering the perceived “supervisor exception” was Turner v.
United States. The issue was whether a government expert who
reviewed forensic reports of a non-testifying expert—regarding whether
the substance distributed by defendant was cocaine—whose reports
were certified, but who did not personally conduct or observe any of
those tests, could testify regarding the analyst’s process, procedures,
conclusions, and results.102 The testifying expert was the analyst
supervisor, who reviewed reports that were certified by the testing
analyst, but who was not the testing analyst. The Seventh Circuit held
that the analyst supervisor’s testimony regarding laboratory procedures
and his review of the testing analyst’s work did not violate the
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.103 Noting the split among the
circuits with regard to the admissibility of surrogate expert testimony,
the petitioner argued that the decision of the Seventh Circuit
“undermines the proper administration of criminal proceedings by
99. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Brewington v. North Carolina, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014)
(No. 12-504) (“[A]llowing a testifying expert to convey a nontestifying expert’s testimonial
findings to the jury substantially bolsters the testifying expert’s opinion while insulating that basis
evidence from adversarial challenge.”).
100. Id. at 7. (“Allowing such testimony through the guise of an ‘independent opinion’ . . .
‘completely ignores the Supreme Court’s explanations of the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause.’” (quoting Brewington, 743 S.E.2d at 34 (Hudson, J., dissenting))).
101. Id. app. A, at 16a (“To permit independent opinion testimony on a critical element of the
offense when that opinion is based on evidence presented at trial not for the truth of the matter
asserted is to permit the North Carolina Rules of Evidence to preempt the Confrontation
Clause.”).
102. United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 931–32 (7th Cir. 2010), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 55
(2012) (mem.). The defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was
violated when a government expert was allowed to testify about test results produced by a
forensic scientist. Id. The defendant also argued that because the forensic scientist’s notes,
machine-generated test results, and final report were testimonial, and because the government had
failed to demonstrate that the forensic scientist was unavailable for cross-examination, the
testifying government expert’s reliance on these materials violated the Confrontation Clause. Id.
103. Id. at 933 (disagreeing with the argument that the district court violated the defendant’s
rights under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause by allowing the testifying, non-testing
analyst to give testimony based upon the results and conclusions of the testing analyst). The
court also addressed the issue of potential juror confusion, noting that neither the testing
scientist’s qualifications nor his report were admitted into evidence or placed before the jury. Id.
at 934.
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providing prosecutors an unwarranted shortcut around the rigors of the
Confrontation Clause.”104
Williams v. Massachusetts also involved surrogate testimony by an
expert about the testing of a substance to determine whether it was
heroin or cocaine.105 The issue was whether the defendant’s right to
confrontation was violated when a testifying chemist was permitted to
testify in place of a testing chemist, even though the testifying chemist
did not participate in conducting the test.106 The testifying chemist was
not a supervisor, and she did not recite the testing chemist’s findings or
conclusions.107 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the
lower court’s finding that the defendant’s Confrontation Clause right
was not violated.108
In Yohe v. Pennsylvania, the petition noted that “federal courts and
state high courts continue to render deeply and intractably divided
opinions” over whether toxicology reports are testimonial, for purposes
of the Confrontation Clause, and whether the testimony of the forensic
toxicologist who authored the report satisfied the defendant’s right to
confrontation.109 The case involved a three-part forensic toxicology
report for blood-alcohol content where each part of the analysis was
conducted by a different analyst.110 The defendant raised the question

104. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Turner v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (No.
13-127). The petitioner argued that the holding of the Seventh Circuit created a shortcut in the
Confrontation Clause process by permitting surrogate testimony that cannot be challenged as
effectively. Id. The petitioner also suggested that surrogate expert testimony provides little in the
way of “insight into the nontestifying analyst’s judgment and competence, or safeguard[s] against
any error, bias, or prejudice on the analyst’s part.” Id.
105. Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 12-P-330, 2013 WL 5493054, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct.
Oct. 4, 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2672 (2014) (mem.). Due to the testing chemist’s
unavailability, the Commonwealth called a second forensic chemist to testify in the testing
chemist’s place. Id. On direct examination, the second chemist testified that, based on her
review of the testing chemist’s lab notes and report, she was able to conclude that the substances
were powder heroin and crack cocaine. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id. The testifying chemist confirmed that she did not participate in the testing of the
substances, was not present when the testing chemist performed the tests, and was not able to
testify as to whether the testing chemist followed lab protocol. Id. Further, neither the testing
chemist’s lab notes nor his drug analysis reports were admitted into evidence. Id.
108. See id. at *3 (affirming the judgments of the lower court pertaining to the alleged
Confrontation Clause issue).
109. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Yohe v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 2662 (2014) (No.
13-885) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari, Yohe].
110. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the toxicology report was testimonial, and
that the testimony of the forensic toxicologist who authored the toxicology report satisfied the
defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 537–38
(Pa. 2013). The laboratory that conducted the forensic toxicology report administered three tests
on the defendant’s blood sample—two gas chromatography tests and a single enzymatic assay
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as to who was the “witness” in this case.111
4. Identifying DNA Profile Evidence
Several petitions addressed the split in authority over criteria for
admitting DNA profile evidence where more than one expert was
involved but not all experts testified. Derr v. Maryland involved a rape
kit test and a DNA profile test.112 The issue was whether Derr’s
constitutional confrontation rights had been violated when the State was
allowed to introduce the opinion of a serology examiner and the results
of DNA testing through the testimony of an expert who neither
participated in, nor supervised the administration of the testing.113 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that neither the results of the
serological exam, nor the results from the DNA test were sufficiently
formalized to rise to the level of testimonial.114 Derr noted that both
Maryland and the District of Columbia argued that the technician’s
report was testimonial hearsay and that the decision should be stayed
pending the resolution of the Williams v. Illinois case.115 Citing the 4–
test. Id. at 524. The defendant objected to the testifying expert’s testimony regarding the
toxicology report, and to the admission of the toxicology report, on the grounds that both the
testimony and report itself violated his right to confront the specific lab technicians who actually
conducted the tests on his blood sample. Id.
111. Id. at 528.
Appellant argues that requiring the analyst who conducted the relevant testing to testify
serves four fundamental purposes: it enables meaningful cross-examination of what the
analyst has done; it guarantees that the analyst who generated the testimonial
statements is questioned under oath and subject to the penalties of perjury; it allows the
fact-finder to observe that witness’s demeanor and her responses to questions; and it
ensures that the accuser face the accused.
Id. In the absence of the opportunity to face his accuser, the defendant contended that allowing
the testimony of a surrogate witness “renders it impossible to determine whether the analyst was
fraudulent or incompetent.” Id.
112. Derr v. State, 73 A.3d 254, 259–60 (Md. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2723 (2014)
(mem.).
113. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Derr v. Maryland (Derr II), 134 S. Ct. 2723 (2014)
(No. 13-637) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari, Derr II].
114. Derr, 73 A.3d at 272 (finding that “the serological exam results [we]re not sufficiently
formalized to be testimonial” and concluding that “the results from the 2002 DNA test [we]re not
sufficiently formalized to be testimonial”).
115. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5–6, Maryland v. Derr (Derr I), 133 S. Ct. 63 (2012)
(No. 11-694) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari, Derr I]. On December 6, 2011, the State of
Maryland filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court to review Derr, requesting
that its petition be suspended while the Court decided Williams v. Illinois. Id. Following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Williams—in which the Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment
without overruling Bullcoming, Melendez-Diaz, or Crawford—the Court granted the State’s
petition for certiorari, vacated Derr, and remanded the case in light of Williams. Maryland v.
Derr, 133 S. Ct. 63 (2012) (mem.). The Court eventually denied certiorari after the Court of
Appeals of Maryland found in favor of the State on remand. Derr, 73 A.3d at 259–60, cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2723 (2014) (mem.).
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1–4 plurality decision later issued in Williams, the petitioner noted that
its “diverging rationales” provide “conflicting guidance for lower
courts” when the non-testing expert testifies.116
In Galloway v. Mississippi, the issue was whether permitting a
forensic analyst to inform the jury of the results of DNA testing that she
did not personally conduct or observe was a violation of the defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights.117 The petition argued that the Mississippi
high court decision permitted surrogate testimony and thus conflicted
with Bullcoming, some federal circuits, and other state high courts.118
In another surrogate case, Walker v. Wisconsin, the testifying analyst
had performed a peer review of another analyst’s test results and
testified regarding that independent review and the conclusions.119 The
petitioner’s argument for certiorari was the same conflict of authority
that Galloway raised—allowing a surrogate witness would not give the
jury the opportunity to assess credibility because the tests were being
spoken about through someone who did not conduct them.120 The
petition for certiorari also discussed the basis rationale121 and whether

116. Petition for Certiorari, Derr II, supra note 115, at 17.
117. At trial, Galloway moved to exclude the testimony of a forensic DNA analyst, due to the
fact that she was not the same analyst who conducted the DNA testing on blood and tissue
samples obtained by the case investigators. See Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 635–36
(Miss. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2661 (2014) (mem.). The expert witness was essentially
permitted to testify as a surrogate for the testing expert, due to her familiarity with each element
of the case and the steps that the analysts followed during testing. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
of Mississippi held that Galloway’s Confrontation Clause right had not been violated by allowing
the DNA analyst to testify. Id. at 637–38.
118. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Galloway v. Mississippi, 134 S. Ct. 2661 (2014)
(No. 13-761).
119. State v. Walker, No. 2011AP2091-CR, 2013 WL 2157893, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 21,
2013) (“Walker argued that he had the right to confront [the testing analyst] because her initial
DNA analysis was presented through [the non-testing analyst], who acted as a transmitter or
conduit for [the testing analyst’s] opinion.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014) (mem.). The
State’s DNA expert witness conducted a peer review—a second analyst’s review of the notes,
profiles, and reports produced by a prior analyst—of an analysis done by the initial testing
analyst, who was on maternity leave at the time of the trial. Id. The testifying analyst did not
attempt to replicate the tests and was considered to be a surrogate witness. Rather than “create a
new profile” or “redo any of the extraction of biological material or DNA,” after reviewing the
notes and DNA profiles of the first analyst, the peer reviewer “almost independently” made the
determination of whether a known individual is the source of extracted DNA evidence. Id.
120. Id. The defendant argued, “he had the right to confront [the testing analyst] because her
initial DNA analysis was presented through [the testifying analyst], who acted as a transmitter or
conduit for [the testing analyst’s] opinion.” Id. Further, the defendant contended that the
testifying analyst’s “description of [the testing analysts] analysis was testimonial, implicating
Walker’s right to confront the witness.” Id.
121. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–12, Walker v. Wisconsin, 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014)
(No. 13-8743). Dissatisfied with the testifying expert’s ability to use test results that he did
conduct, the Petitioner highlighted court of appeals cases “[rejecting] the argument that a
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or not the information should be disclosed to the jurors on the
underlying basis for the expert’s opinion.122
III. THE REMAINING UNCERTAINTY IN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
DOCTRINE
Based on the current doctrine, as discussed in Part II, this Part
analyzes three major areas of continuing uncertainty in Confrontation
Clause analysis. Those areas are: (1) which witnesses and what
information count as “evidence against the criminal defendant” that is a
substitute for trial testimony, (2) whether evidence that links to a
particular individual should be evaluated differently than evidence not
(yet) connected to a particular individual, and (3) how the reasonable
reliance test should apply to expert witness evidence obtained through a
collaborative environment.
A. Who and What Counts as Evidence Against the Criminal Defendant?
On the issue of who counts as a “witness against the defendant,”123
some say this point is settled,124 but at least one of the recent petitions
indicated that the Court still needs to decide.125 In Clark, the Court
reasoned that where the declarant’s primary purpose was that the
statement be a substitute for trial testimony, it counts as “against” the

supervisor’s testimony is permissible simply because the underlying reports were not admitted,”
“[holding] that a supervising medical examiner’s testimony based on a report of an autopsy
conducted by a different examiner conveyed testimonial hearsay that violated the Confrontation
Clause,” and “[finding] that a surrogate expert’s testimony that two DNA profiles matched
violated the Confrontation Clause because the surrogate expert did not conduct the DNA analyses
at issue and based his opinion on his review of a nontestifying analyst’s certified report and the
documentation generated by that analyst.” Id. (citing Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033,
1043–44 (D.D.C 2013); State v. Frazier, 735 S.E.2d 727, 731–32 (W. Va. 2012); and Davidson v.
State, No. 58459, 2013 WL 1458654, at *1–2 (Nev. Apr. 9, 2013)).
122. Id. Even though none of the materials produced by the testing analyst were entered into
evidence, the petitioner took issue with the fact that the testifying expert’s testimony made it clear
to the jury that the most crucial parts of his testimony were from the testing analyst’s reports. Id.
123. For a detailed discussion of the term “witness” and the meaning of the phrase “witnesses
against,” see Bellin, supra note 40, at 1881–88. Professor Bellin notes that the most logical
explanation regarding the Framers’ inclusion of the phrase “against him” in the Sixth Amendment
lies in the distinction between the broad category of “witnesses”—individuals Bellin defines as
having “perceived relevant information, but whom play no role in a criminal proceeding”—and
the narrower category of “witnesses against”—described by Bellin as those contributing
testimony or out-of-court statements to the prosecution’s case that result in triggering the
confrontation right. Id.
124. See Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, Grabbing the Bullcoming by the Horns:
How the Supreme Could Have used Bullcoming v. New Mexico to Clarify Confrontation Clause
Requirements for CSI-Type Reports, 90 NEB. L. REV. 502, 526 (2011) (opining that the Court
adequately addressed and resolved this issue in its Bullcoming opinion).
125. Petition for Certiorari, Yohe, supra note 109, at i.
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defendant.126 So while the past petitions show that the Court has been
unclear on whether the witness is the person who tests the evidence or
the person who testifies about the test, extending the rationale in Clark
would mean that the person who tests and records the data is the witness
against the defendant if she intended for her report to substitute for trial
testimony. Thus, both the testing expert and the testifying expert would
seem to be witnesses against the criminal defendant, and therefore
implicate the Confrontation Clause.
Consider when the testimony is like that in Maxwell and OrtizZape,127 where the witness asserts her independent conclusion based on
her review of the testing analyst’s work is that the testing analyst’s
conclusion is correct. There, the evidence can be both direct (no
inference is needed if one believes the testing analyst’s conclusion is
correct), and circumstantial (inferences are required to show why and
how the testifying analyst’s review of the testing analyst’s work was
appropriate, reliable, thorough, and trustworthy). As petitions like
Turner described in Part II.B demonstrate, many courts find that the
witness giving the “independent opinion” in court is providing the
evidence against the defendant, and, therefore, there is no Confrontation
Clause problem when that witness is available for cross-examination.128
In cases where there is no “independent conclusion,” there is a greater
likelihood of a court finding a Confrontation Clause violation if the
testifying witness is basically parroting the results of another expert’s
analysis.129 Still, there is no clear answer to this question.
Lapse of time between when statements are prepared and when a
(potential) perpetrator is identified can also be an obstacle when it
comes to the Confrontation Clause. This is especially true in cold cases
where law enforcement personnel identify a specific criminal defendant.
There is no guarantee that a match ever will be found and hence at the
time of testing there can be no accusation or identified perpetrator.
When reports are prepared months, weeks, or even years, and in some

126. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2183 (2015).
127. See United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that the
testifying analyst testified that the substance seized from the defendant contained cocaine base);
see also State v. Ortiz-Zape, 743 S.E.2d 156, 159 (N.C. 2013) (noting that the testifying analyst
testified that the substance was cocaine).
128. Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari at 19 & n.8, United States v. Turner, 134 S. Ct.
2660 (2014) (No. 13-127) (describing cases wherein surrogate testimony was permitted based on
a report of a non-testifying expert); see also Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari at 10, OrtizZape v. North Carolina, 134 S. Ct 2660 (2014) (No. 13-633) (noting an expert may testify to an
independent opinion—based on observations and analysis—without running afoul of the
Confrontation Clause).
129. See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text.
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cases decades,130 before any particular defendant is identified, the
argument could be that the report was not testimonial (on the grounds
that it is not accusatorial under Williams). If instead we look at the
intent of the reporter—that it was made to provide evidence for later use
at trial—such reports may be more likely to fit in the testimonial
category. The Clark case provides support for this mode of analysis as
the intent of the child declarant was an important factor in determining
that the primary purpose of the statement was not testimonial.131
What about when a machine produces the evidence? Under the
general rule that machine-generated evidence does not constitute
hearsay, it should not implicate the Confrontation Clause.132
Nevertheless, courts and defense attorneys expect that one needs to
confront the person who calibrates, runs, checks, and maintains the
machine, in order to ensure that the proper procedures were followed.133
Furthermore, the opportunity for errors, omissions, and outright
falsification—as evidenced by a chemist in Massachusetts who was
found to have tampered with evidence, forged initials on samples, and
turned negative samples into positive ones—should give the courts
pause when truncating confrontation rights involving physical
evidence.134
B. Does It Matter Whether the Evidence Connects to a Known Person?
A second open issue that arises from the various court decisions is
whether the evidence must be connected to a known person at the time
of the testing and analysis in order to be considered testimonial, as some
members of the Court and lower court decisions referenced in petitions

130. Derr v. State, 73 A.3d 254 (Md. 2013); see also Petition for Certiorari, Derr I, supra note
115, at 2 (noting almost two decades passed from crime to indictment).
131. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015).
132. See Petition for Certiorari, Ortiz-Zape, supra note 81 at 9 (discussing the court’s finding
that machine-generated evidence does not constitute hearsay); see also Petition for Certiorari,
Turner, supra note 104, at 2. Machine-generated evidence is not hearsay because it is not
considered to be a statement or assertion. See FED. R. OF EVID. 801–07; People v. Arauz, No.
B242843, 2013 WL 3357931, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 3, 2013) (noting that because “[m]achine
readouts are not ‘statements’ and machines are not ‘declarants,’” machine-generated DNA
printouts do not implicate the Confrontation Clause).
133. There is an argument that machine-generated reports do contain assertions; it is just that
the assertion is not made by a person. This artificial limitation on the scope of who can create
hearsay is based on the fact that machines have no incentive to prevaricate or no real opportunity
to do so, unlike people, and therefore the courts see no need to bring the machine into court to recreate its assertion, statement, or conclusion about the makeup of a particular substance. See
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823–28 (2006).
134. See Anthony Del Signore, Note, Into the Rabbit-Hole: Annie Dookhan Confronts
Melendez-Diaz, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 161, 161–62, 168–71 (2014).
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before the Court suggest.135 According to the Williams Court,
statements are much more likely to be considered testimonial when they
provide a link to a particular suspect who is already in custody.136 The
Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Polidore, has applied Williams in just
this way (or perhaps extended it) by noting that information obtained to
help with an ongoing investigation into an open crime is an additional
category of evidence that is not considered testimonial.137
If an accusation is not required, then must the statement relate to a
targeted individual?138 Now, after the Court’s decision in Clark, it
seems that information addressing whether or not a crime occurred (e.g.,
whether the bruises on the child were a result of the child’s own
clumsiness or the crime of child abuse) and who might be the
perpetrator if there was a crime is not considered testimonial.139 Thus,
we can answer another question in the negative—accusatory statements
are not necessarily testimonial, even if they do identify a specific
individual.
A related issue is what is evidence against the defendant? Is it the
underlying opinion, such as “based on the testing analyst’s report, my
conclusion is that the DNA profile matches,” as in Derr,140 or the fact
that “I agree with the testing analyst’s conclusion that the substance was
cocaine,” as in Brewington?141 The courts answer this question of what
counts as evidence against the defendant differently,142 and the issues
135. See infra notes 63–69, 76, and accompanying text.
136. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2249–51
(Breyer, J., concurring).
137. United States v. Polidore, 690 F. 3d 705, 718 (5th Cir. 2012) (referring to Justice Alito’s
plurality opinion, wherein Alito explained that the primary purpose of the prepared report was to
“catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large,” and thus it could not be testimonial because it
involved an ongoing investigation (citing Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243 (plurality opinion))).
138. As Professor Freidman notes, “this, plainly, has never been the law.” Friedman’s answer
to the second question is similarly negative, stating “such a test has no more merit than an
accusation test.” See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation in Forensic Laboratory Reports,
Round Four, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 81 (2012).
139. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015).
140. Derr v. State, 73 A.3d 254, 262 (Md. 2013) (noting that the testifying expert presented
her conclusion that the “DNA taken from the vaginal swabs, analyzed in 2002, matched the DNA
taken from Derr’s buccal swab, analyzed in 2004”).
141. State v. Brewington, 743 S.E.2d 626, 627 (N.C. 2013) (noting that the testifying agent
testified that “in her opinion, the substance was cocaine base.”).
142. See Petition for Certiorari, Derr II, supra note 115, at app. 135 (“[E]xpert witness
testimony regarding underlying facts and data, which may be otherwise inadmissible, is not
considered hearsay when done for the purpose of explaining his or her opinion.” (quoting Derr v.
State, 29 A.3d 533 (Md. 2011)); see also Petition for Certiorari, Brewington, supra note 99, at 6a
(noting that while a “truly independent expert opinion may serve as evidence in the case,” and
that “an opinion based solely on review of an agreement with the inadmissible under the
Confrontation Clause,” the testifying analyst did nothing more than review the testing analyst’s
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presented in Clark did not provide an opportunity for clarification. This
author proposes that it makes a difference whether the evidence is
needed to establish the identity of an alleged perpetrator, which is more
likely to involve inferences based on circumstantial evidence, or to
establish an element of the crime, which is more likely to involve
whether one believes direct evidence. As direct evidence is often more
probative and less dependent upon inferences, it may be appropriate for
courts to treat direct expert evidence, like substance tests, differently for
Confrontation Clause purposes than circumstantial expert evidence, like
DNA profiles.
For instance, consider “what was done” evidence. Many courts find
autopsy reports to be not testimonial—at least the portions about the
observations of the condition of the body—and make similar findings as
to machine-generated results identifying a particular substance as being
what the substance is.143 In both the autopsy and the substance
identification situations, the evidence can be characterized as direct
evidence—meaning that no inferences are required when the report says
that a body had bruising on the neck, or weighed 150 pounds. The
finder of fact can believe the evidence and determine that the body had
bruising and weighed 150 pounds, or not.
Similarly, no inferences are required when a machine identifies a
white powdery substance as “pure cocaine” or as heroin. The finder of
fact can believe the evidence and determine the substance was cocaine
or heroin, or not. If the charge is possession of a controlled substance
and one believes the powdery substance to be a controlled substance,
then again, no inference is required to determine the possession element
of the crime. When the charge is driving under the influence and the
driver’s urine test is positive for an illegal substance, no inference is
needed to determine whether the driver was under the influence.
In most drug and alcohol cases, the person who is alleged to have
possessed or imbibed the potentially contraband substance is usually
known because the substance was found on their person, in the
immediate vicinity, or in their bodily fluids. In all of the cases that were
presented for review involving the identification of the substance, the
perpetrator or person from whom the substance was taken was known.
Thus, in the “what was done,” possession, or impairment types of cases,
the statement about the substance (or substance in the bodily fluid) is
inherently accusative and requires no inferences.
On the other hand, percipient witness identifications may be either a
notes and results and agree with her conclusion).
143. See FED. R. OF EVID. 801.
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general description or a specifically identifiable person. A specific
identification is like identifying a substance. For instance, a percipient
witness’s statement that “I saw Paul get in his car after downing four
vodka shots” is analogous to an expert witness’s statement that “Paul’s
blood test revealed the alcohol concentration in his blood to be in excess
of the legal limit.” Both statements involve direct evidence, and no
inference is required if the finder of fact believes it.
However, a general description (such as that the perpetrator had red
hair, was male, about thirty to forty years old, and about six-feet, sixinches tall) is more like a DNA profile, which can establish the odds of
someone with a similar profile being the perpetrator, or it can establish
the presence of a person with that profile at the crime scene. The
evidence is circumstantial because it requires inferential links to find a
matching person and then to connect that person to the crime. This
chain of inferences raises the question of whether there should be a
different rule for when the expert’s statement is more circumstantial,
and therefore less accusatorial, as it is in most DNA cases involving
open or unsolved crimes.
Is an open crime exception too narrow a view of the Confrontation
Clause? In either case, where the perpetrator is identified or not yet
identified, evidence linking to a particular individual, whether in
custody or not, seems to be accusatory, just like the child’s
identification of his abuser in Clark. Does the necessity of inferential
reasoning make the DNA report less accusatory than the blood-alcohol
level? Perhaps it does, at least until a person who matches the profile is
identified.144 At that point, the evidence of the DNA profile amounts to
the accusation that “he was present at the crime scene,” but, unlike the
blood evidence in a driving under the influence case, the DNA profile
match does not establish an element of the crime.
Whether the donor is known or later determined, the statement has
the same properties. However, there is a concern about reliability and
trustworthiness in situations where an expert’s testing methodology or
interpretation could be compromised if the expert has knowledge of the
donor’s identity in advance of, or during, the test. The “who did it”
DNA-type cases are circumstantial evidence because of how DNA
analysis works: It gives a percentage chance of someone other than the
144. It should not make any constitutional difference whether a suspect is in custody. What
matters is whether the information links to an individual. In contrast to the identification-of-asubstance cases, in some of the situations in which DNA testing was used, the DNA donor was
known. In other situations, the DNA donor information and profile were sent to a nationwide
databank and either quickly or, in some cases, decades later found to connect to a specifically
identifiable individual.
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identified individual matching the DNA sample profile, which directly
proves the person’s DNA was there, but is only circumstantial evidence
of whether the individual connected to the DNA committed the
crime.145
While several petitions provided the Court an opportunity for
clarification, after Clark, the Confrontation Clause doctrine remains
jumbled in the area of whether a statement must be accusatory or
connect to a known or identified subject, in order to implicate the
defendant’s protections under the clause. What we can safely say is that
the fact that a statement is accusatory and connects to a known person is
not sufficient to render the statement testimonial. By requiring a
contextual evaluation of the intent of the speaker, as well as the position
or duties of the listener or interrogator, the Clark Court has backtracked
from the accusation rationale of the Williams plurality opinion.
The next Section addresses the issue of reasonable reliance and how
errors in the testing process could have greater implications in “what
was done” cases than in the “who did it” cases.
C. When Is It Reasonable to Rely on the Work of Another Expert?
A third area of uncertainty is implicated by the collaborative
environment in which scientific evidence is analyzed. By denying
certiorari in all of the cases involving expert witness testimony, the
Court seems unready or unwilling to address the issue of the limits of
reasonable reliance among a community of scientific experts.
While experts are permitted to rely on inadmissible matter, as long as
reliance upon such matter is reasonable within that field of expertise,
the question becomes when is it reasonable to rely upon procedures
being properly followed by other experts or other technicians? Some
courts and decisions have determined that the information that forms the
basis upon which this reasonable reliance attaches is not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted and therefore there is no Confrontation
Clause violation.146 The lower courts that interpret Williams to assert
that basis evidence is not testimonial limit what counts as evidence
against the defendant when the evidence is used merely as the basis for
the expert opinion.147 Other courts disagree with the notion that there is
no Confrontation Clause violation because basis information is

145. Except perhaps in cases of rape, where the issue is identity of the alleged assailant, rather
than consent or lack thereof.
146. See supra Part II (certiorari petitions).
147. See State v. Ortiz-Zape, 743 S.E.2d 156 (N.C. 2013) (discussing the basis of evidence
and confusion).
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“reasonably relied upon” by experts in their fields, in part, on the
grounds that the Framers could not have considered reasonable reliance
to excuse Confrontation Clause violations when they drafted the Bill of
Rights, given that the notion of reasonable reliance is a relatively recent
formulation in the revised Federal Rules of Evidence.148
When evidence is used in this way, it is similar to the non-truth
purpose of explaining subsequent conduct or describing the layout of
the room—it is not necessary to prove the layout of the room, but rather
that the witness had some knowledge of the room, perhaps by being
present in that room in the past.149
Professors David Kaye and Jennifer Mnookin refer to this as the nontruth purpose of “illumination”—a “nonsubstantive purpose of helping
the judge or jury understand and evaluate the expert’s opinions—while
suspending all judgment on the truth.”150 For instance, there is a
difference between an expert report stating that “the blood-alcohol level
of the accused was X%,” which is direct evidence of guilt in exceeding
the legal limit where the limit is less than X, and “the DNA sample
profile is YY, and only .000001% of the population have that DNA
profile.” The latter can be simply basis evidence, which is only
circumstantial evidence of guilt in committing the crime.
Nevertheless, when the roles of gathering, testing, evaluating,
analyzing, and testifying are performed by more than one expert,
additional issues remain as to who and what counts as evidence against
the criminal defendant. For instance, determining whether the evidence
is truly being used circumstantially is a point of contention. Kaye and
Mnookin criticize the Williams decision because the “disclosure of
Cellmark’s role [as an accredited outside lab, often used to help with the
department’s backlog] cannot be seen as serving ‘the legitimate
nonhearsay purpose of illuminating the expert’s thought process.’”151
148. See supra Part II (certiorari petitions).
149. See David Kaye & Jennifer Mnookin, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the
Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 133–34 (citing Bridges v. State, 19 N.W.2d 529
(Wis. 1945), for a non-hearsay use of a description of a room where a minor was allegedly
sexually assaulted:
The very fact that she could describe such a room, proven to exist by other evidence,
suggests that she was in fact in such a room—not because she says so, but because the
chances of her being able to make up a description based on her imagination or other
sources of knowledge is massively implausible and thus extraordinarily unlikely to be
the result of mere coincidence or chicanery.
150. Id. at 123.
151. Id. at 123–24 (citing Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2240 (2012) (plurality
opinion)); see also supra notes 78–81 and accompanying notes. Kaye and Mnookin provide a
detailed analysis of why the evidence does not illuminate “how a computer makes a match, how
the matching database record is linked to [the defendant] or how rare the matching features are in
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While she admits that the database match on the alleles that Cellmark
(the outside lab) returned to the Illinois State Police (government lab),
which also matched to a suspect picked out of a line-up, is some
circumstantial evidence that the Cellmark lab properly performed the
tests on the appropriate sample, the circumstantial chain of inference is
less strong than the opinion suggests. “[T]rawling large databases
creates many opportunities for even an incorrectly generated DNA
profile to match somebody. “152 Having five people in a line-up
fourteen months after the incident increases the chances that the witness
will make an erroneous selection, especially if the witness is already
inclined to select someone after so much time has elapsed since the
crime.153
When the evidence is used as a basis, the more important question
seems to be “how does or should the court analyze the difference
between percipient witnesses and expert witnesses?”
Percipient
witnesses are usually the ones to provide any direct evidence in the case
because they saw, heard, smelled, touched, tasted, or felt something
happen.154 While percipient witnesses can also provide circumstantial
evidence—such as when they saw something that requires an inference
to connect it to an element of the charge—when they give an opinion,
that opinion must be “rationally based on the perception of the witness,”
and thus remain directly connected to one of the five senses.155
In contrast, one common use of expert witness testimony is to
provide an opinion based on having facts made known to the expert at
or prior to trial and using her expertise to form an opinion without any
participation in, testing of, or analyzing of evidence gathered from the
crime scene. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 permits experts to rely on
other matter, but lay witnesses do not have this option.156 When the
experts are in a scientific field that requires them to observe information
and evidence gathered from the crime scene, or from subsequent tests
on that evidence, they can become percipient witnesses to the gathering
or testing of the evidence, and then use their expertise to form opinions.
Those opinions, while based on the data and the evidence, transcend
that data and evidence.157 Thus, in many contexts, expert witnesses can

the population.” Kaye & Mnookin, supra note 149, at 127.
152. Id. at 134.
153. Id. at 135.
154. FED. R. EVID. 701.
155. FED. R. EVID. 701(a).
156. FED. R. EVID. 701, 703.
157. Kaye & Mnookin, supra note 149, at 150–51 (“When the conventional witness testifies
to ‘bricks’ within his firsthand knowledge, his knowledge does not depend on the other bricks in
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be quasi-percipient and quasi-expert.
This dual role of expert witnesses highlights a fundamental conflict
between the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 703 and the
notion of “scientific validity.” If scientific validity is the standard, then
we must analyze how the reliance in a community of scientists enhances
or detracts from that standard. The question is when is it appropriate for
an expert to rely upon the work of another in giving an opinion, or in
reaching a so-called “independent conclusion.”158
What constitutes “reasonable reliance” should depend more closely
on past experience between the expert testifying at trial and the
individual analyst who performed the actual test, or at a minimum, with
the individual lab where the tests were performed. It may be more
reasonable to rely upon the procedures and the accuracy of materials
from a lab with which the expert has had a close working relationship,
or repeated experience, than it would to be to rely on information from a
lab with which the expert does not have any prior experience. Only
then can one say reliance is reasonable upon someone else’s facts,
conclusions, and testing procedures.159
Error rates matter on the issue of reasonable reliance, as well as on
the issue of the criminal defendant’s right to confront the evidence
against him. Different tests have different rates of error.160 Professor
Friedman notes that it is harder to make a mistake that would result in
identifying a DNA profile that actually matches a particular person. In
fact, a mistaken or incompetent analyst can more easily make an error
that results in the blood-alcohol level percentage or percentage of
cocaine in a substance being greater than it actually is.161 An error that
exaggerates the actual percentage may result in evidence that the level
exceeds the legal threshold, when in reality the level does not.
Another issue to consider is whether the incompetent analyst is likely
to make an error that determines a substance is cocaine when it is not, or
that there is alcohol in the blood when there is not. We know of at least
one analyst who made this miscalculation or misinterpretation (and even
the same way that an expert’s often does. . . . By contrast, the knowledge claims of forensic
science witnesses are, intrinsically, strongly interlinked with the actions and knowledge
production of others.”).
158. Id. at 157–58.
159. Some courts have found that this question goes to the weight of the evidence provided by
the expert testimony and not to its admissibility.
160. For instance, admitting that the odds of both an erroneous match and an erroneous
identification are difficult to quantify, Kaye and Mnookin note that we can be confident that those
odds, whatever, they might be, “are far higher than the one-in-many-quadrillion random-match
probabilities presented for Williams’s DNA.” Id. at 136.
161. See Friedman, supra note 138, at 74.

PDF (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/1/16 2:06 PM

Confrontation’s Convolutions

849

did so intentionally in some cases) by finding a sample to be positive for
a banned substance when the correct analysis was negative.162
It is highly probative that a report lists a particular DNA profile,
regardless of the reliability of the analyst and her process.163 Why?
Consider two people being asked to think about a number between one
and one million and coming up with numbers that are less than ten
numbers apart. Because there are so many millions of combinations of
DNA profiles, there is a very low probability of an analyst identifying a
profile that matches so well to a particular individual when the DNA
sample is not from that individual, or from his or her identical twin.
However, as discussed earlier, a DNA match is much more
circumstantial and much less direct than a blood-alcohol level.164
Inferences are required to connect the DNA match to guilt of the
criminal charges. Thus it would seem that the danger of unconfronted
direct evidence of the blood-alcohol level for “what is it” cases should
be of greater concern than it is for DNA profiles in “who is it” cases.
IV. POTENTIAL APPROACHES FOR THE COURTS
The muddled state of the doctrine leaves much room for
improvement, and four options come to mind. The first expands upon
Professors Kaye and Mnookin’s idea to treat expert witnesses in
scientific fields differently than other experts. The second is to consider
carving out a portion of the testimonial definition to exclude certain
percipient and expert testimony. In conjunction with the second option,
this Article analyzes a third proposal others have made in relying upon
existing hearsay exceptions to admit expert testimony based on the
information, observations, and tests of other experts. The fourth option,
which complements the other three, is to craft specialized instructions
for jury cases.
A. Treating Scientific Experts Differently When They Are QuasiPercipient
Is there
reasonable
reasonable
argue that

a principled reason for a different assessment of what is
reliance in the scientific community in contrast to what is
reliance with other types of experts? Kaye and Mnookin
perhaps there should be,165 suggesting that some sort of

162. See Del Signore, supra note 134, at 162 n.1 (quoting the signed statement of Annie
Dookhan, the analyst at issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, stating “I intentionally turned a
negative sample into a positive a few times.”).
163. Freidman, supra note 138, at 74–75.
164. Id. at 74.
165. Kaye & Mnookin, supra note 149, at 151–52. The article describes the difference
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science exception may be warranted and recognizing that “science is a
collective phenomenon that both produces distributed knowledge and
permits, and indeed requires, a certain bounded degree of epistemic
deference to the findings of others.”166 They conclude:
When thinking about how to approach the Confrontation Clause, the
distinctive feature of science that requires focused attention is that it is
a collective enterprise: it produces distributed knowledge located
across individuals rather than held by someone standing alone, and its
participants engage in epistemic deference, deference that is supported
by careful documentation. Only by confronting what these aspects of
science ought to mean for the operation of the Confrontation Clause
will the Court be able to develop an approach to this thorny set of
issues that adequately respects both Confrontation Clause values and
the practices of science.167

Expert witnesses who test DNA and blood-alcohol content must be
more involved with the evidence, having interacted with it prior to trial
in order to conduct their tests, obtain their results, and then draw their
conclusions. This involvement occurs in a different situation than the
typical “hypothetical question” expert opinion evidence. These experts
are quasi-percipient and quasi-expert as noted above.168
Can Confrontation Clause jurisprudence address the situation that
arises when there is some sort of dual percipient and expert testimony?
Kaye and Mnookin suggest that the scientific process of “distributive
cognition does directly raise Confrontation Clause problems”169 and that
the Court will not solve that problem until it “forthrightly confronts the
question of whether science is special in ways that warrant distinctive
treatment” under the clause.170 While the Federal Rules of Evidence
and courts have long understood a bright line between lay opinion
testimony and expert opinion testimony,171 allowing a new category that
between a conventional witness and forensic science witnesses whose knowledge “requires
reliance on what others have done and what others know.” Id. at 154.
166. Id. at 155.
167. Id. at 159.
168. See supra notes 156–164 and accompanying text.
169. Kaye & Mnookin, supra note 149, at 152.
170. Id. at 158.
171. FED. R. EVID. 701–04; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138
(1999) (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 703 grants all expert witnesses “testimonial latitude
unavailable to other witnesses on the assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable
basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline”); United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125
F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing lay witness testimony as being governed by Federal
Rule of Evidence 701, and expert witness testimony as being governed by Federal Rule of
Evidence 702); United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing the limits
placed on the admissibility of lay opinions at trial by Federal Rule of Evidence 701); United
States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1189 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence
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overlaps the two may provide a more palatable mechanism for applying
the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in these cases. It may be that
courts should apply a different standard in cases involving these hybrid
types of testimony.
After Clark, the Court left open whether any non-law enforcement
personnel in any circumstance could be the recipient of a testimonial
statement, noting that “at least some statements to individuals who are
not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation
concerns.”172 We now know that who is doing the questioning matters,
as well as whether they are charged with uncovering, investigating, or
prosecuting crimes.173 One group of non-law enforcement personnel is
private laboratory employees who test samples and identify DNA.
Though they do not necessarily interrogate, they use a scientific process
of inquiry to obtain information that helps to “uncover” potential
suspects, and thus there is a strong argument based on Clark that the
“statements” (in the form of data compilations, testing results, and other
“reports”) made to these experts in the collaborative scientific
environment should implicate the Confrontation Clause. By leaving
open the possibility of some separation between the recipient of the
statement and the law enforcement or governmental authority, the Court
has permitted lower courts to expand the opportunities for the trier of
fact to consider the percipient and expert testimony discussed earlier.
Another issue to reconcile is Justice Thomas’s opinion in Clark,
which notes that sufficient indicia of solemnity should be the main
factor in determining whether a statement is testimonial, regardless of
whether it was made to a private person or to an agent of law
enforcement.174 Thomas reiterated an argument he presented in his
Williams opinion, which explained that while basis evidence may be
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, there is not the necessary
formality or solemnity, and so it is not considered testimonial despite
being for the truth of the matter asserted.175 However, if it is neither
solemn nor formal, then it is even less reliable and therefore should be
even less likely to be admitted under the reasonable reliance standard.

704(b) bars an expert from stating “an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did
not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged”).
172. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181–82 (2015).
173. Id. at 2183 (noting that teachers are not converted by mandatory reporter statutes into a
“law enforcement mission aimed primarily at gathering evidence for prosecution”).
174. Id. at 2186 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
175. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2255, 2259 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting
that the purpose at bar was an evidentiary one, “concerned with the exigencies of an ongoing
emergency, rather than with producing evidence in the ordinary course”).
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On the other hand, if we focus on the question of whether the primary
purpose of the expert providing the basis evidence is her intent to have
the evidence used at trial, then we have two answers. If there is no
identified individual, then some on the Court would say that the primary
purpose would be an ongoing investigation or to catch an unidentified
suspect still at large, which renders the statement not testimonial under
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion in Williams, the Fifth Circuit in the
Polidore case described earlier,176 and apparently under the majority
opinion of Clark. If there is an identified individual, then under Clark,
the specifically targeted accusation evidence is not sufficient to render
the statement testimonial, and we must examine the broader context of
the intent of the expert in creating the statement, as well as the expert’s
role in uncovering, investigating, or prosecuting the crime, in order to
determine whether the statement is testimonial.
B. Overcoming the Testimonial Hurdle: Rendering Other Statements
Not Testimonial
Justice Breyer presents the option in Williams that we could declare
expert witness reports as not testimonial and rely upon them as similar
to business records under that hearsay exception, particularly if there is
no suspect in mind at the time the reports are created.177 Would it be
possible to declare, as Justice Breyer suggested, that expert reports are
not testimonial? To the extent the reports were prepared in anticipation
of later use at trial, they fit the current definition when they contain
some formality and some validity to the extent of being sworn or
certified.
Such a declaration would be a significant departure from MelendezDiaz,178 and likely would further diminish the confrontation rights of
criminal defendants if applied to all expert reports. However, there is a
principled reason for making a distinction between expert reports that
relate to direct evidence in the “what was done” cases, from those
reports that relate to “who did it” cases. To the extent the expert is
more of a percipient witness, such as when determining the bloodalcohol content of a sample, there is an argument that the report can be
excluded from the definition of “testimonial” without significantly
impacting the defendant’s confrontation rights.
Is the real issue that “testimonial” is the wrong word? From a
176. See Toney, supra note 70, at 976–79 (discussing United States v. Polidore, 690 F.3d 705
(5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1583); see supra note 137 and accompanying text.
177. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2251–52 (Breyer, J., concurring).
178. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009) (holding that the certificates
were testimonial).
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layperson’s perspective, anything that eventually was presented at trial
would appear to be testimonial, as the Clark Court noted, stating:
Our Confrontation Clause decisions, however, do not determine
whether a statement is testimonial by examining whether a jury
would view the statement as the equivalent of in-court
testimony. The logic of this argument, moreover, would lead to
the conclusion that virtually all out-of-court statements offered
by the prosecution are testimonial.179
Toney suggests one solution to the problem: revise the formula of
expert witness responses to hypothetical questions to be something like
“if X were true, then Y follows,” rather than the current version which
seems to be “Y is true because of X.”180 The “if . . . , then . . .” formula
is less conclusory than the “if false, then . . . because . . .” formula that
litigators so often use,181 because the jurors still can decide whether or
not they believe X to be true before accepting the expert’s conclusion.
When the expert does not give a conclusion that Y is true, there is a
stronger basis for the argument that the opinion is not relying upon
underlying data from another expert for the truth of the matter asserted.
Rephrasing the evidence in this way, combined with jury instructions
that specifically remind the jurors that they cannot use the basis
evidence for its truth, might temper some of these concerns.
The next Section analyzes how to use the hearsay exceptions if the
more percipient portions of the scientific expert reports are deemed not
testimonial.
C. Using Traditional Hearsay Exceptions
A third approach puts greater focus on meeting hearsay exceptions as
a basis for admissibility. If quasi-percipient experts are granted special
treatment, or if the definition of testimonial is refined to exclude certain
expert statements and reports, then traditional hearsay exceptions can
apply to render the statements, testimony, and reports admissible.
Justice Scalia feared a return to the less-protective Ohio v. Roberts
standard, stating:
[A] suspicious mind (or even one that is merely not naïve) might
regard this distortion [through dictum conveying hostility to the
Crawford case] as the first step in an attempt to smuggle
longstanding hearsay exceptions back into the Confrontation
Clause—in other words, an attempt to return to Ohio v.
179. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183 (majority opinion).
180. Toney, supra note 70, at 53; see also Friedman, supra note 138, at 65.
181. See L. TIMOTHY PERRIN, H. MITCHELL CALDWELL & CAROL A. CHASE, THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF TRIAL ADVOCACY (2d ed. 2011).
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Roberts.182
If the testimonial hurdle is removed, when an expert report is offered
into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted, the next question to
ask is “what makes the supervisor testimony adequate over that of the
technician who actually performed the scientific test?” In some cases, it
seems that a certification makes the difference,183 and the language of
the certification is important because some certifications attest that the
findings or conclusions are accurate,184 as opposed to attesting that the
proper procedures were actually followed.185
One author suggests that simply including in reports an affirmation
by the analyst and the reviewer could provide courts with a “broad basis
for admission,” using traditional hearsay exceptions.186 He suggests
specific language that can be included in each report to lay an
appropriate foundation for admissibility under a particular hearsay
exception. The examples include (1) present sense impression: “This
report consists of results observed by the analyst”; (2) recorded
recollection: “This report consists of the observations of the analyst
recorded shortly after the occurrence and adopted by the analyst as true,
accurate, and complete”; (3) records of a regularly conducted activity:
“This report was produced by the analyst, a person with personal
knowledge, at the time of testing, as part of the normal operation of this
laboratory.
This report is subject to independent review and
confirmation of its validity”; and (4) public records: “This report was
produced as part of the state’s normal operation and is recorded as a
public record.”187 This language in a certification lays the proper
foundation for a hearsay exception for the report when signed by the
testing analyst, and the note then argues that the supervisor’s testimony
about the test should be admissible.188
Autopsy reports are often considered public records, which supports
the primary purpose analysis. In many situations, the coroner is under a

182. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2184–85 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
183. See United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2010); Marshall v. People, 309
P.3d 943, 945 (Colo. 2013); State v. Walker, No. 2011AP2091-CR, 2013 WL 2157893 (Wis. Ct.
App. May 21, 2013).
184. See Marshall, 309 P.3d at 945. The technician supervisor testified that she would certify
the results of the testing analysts’ report and send them back to the requesting police department.
Id.
185. See Turner, 591 F.3d at 931–32. The testifying expert was the analyst supervisor who
reviewed reports that were certified by the testing analyst for proper procedure. Id.
186. See Eric Nielsen, The Admission of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Crawford World, 14
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 951, 979 (2013).
187. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(1), 803(5), 803(6) & 803(8).
188. Nielson, supra note 186 at 979.
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statutory duty to create the report based on the autopsy, and some courts
find that autopsy reports are not testimonial because the purpose is to
determine the cause of death, not for later use at trial.189 Further,
autopsy reports are not prepared by police officers or law enforcement
personnel, although the coroner usually is an employee of the
government in some way.
But is it stretching the imagination to say that these reports are not
prepared in order to determine whether a crime was committed (what
was done), and, if so, who committed the crime (who did it)?
Ascertaining the cause of death can help narrow down whether a crime
was committed (what was done), which in turn can help narrow down
who could have committed the crime (who did it). This purpose
contrasts with the situation where the creator of the report planned to
use it against a particular defendant at trial. As a practical matter,
however, the facts and circumstances determine the extent to which a
coroner’s autopsy report could be impacted by the existence of a
suspect, or a particular defendant, in the case. In some situations, the
police officers have participated in the autopsy and provided advice
about a person of interest, suspect, or even actual defendant, during the
autopsy, which may have an influence on the coroner’s report.
The public records exception under the Federal Rules of Evidence
does not apply to statements made by law enforcement in criminal
cases.190 However, the Melendez-Diaz Court rejected the use of such
reports as business records where the regularly conducted business
activity is preparing evidence for use at trial.191 Linking the report to a
business record enhances reliability. Moreover, as discussed in Part II,
reliability is no longer the linchpin of the Confrontation Clause analysis.
What matters is whether or not a statement or report is testimonial, and
if so, there must be the opportunity to confront.192 The formality and
solemnity are not necessarily related to reliability, although all three are
factors taken into consideration in the business records hearsay
exception.
Is the past recollection recorded hearsay exception a potentially

189. Petition for Certiorari, Edwards, supra note 72, at 2.
190. See FED. R. EVID. 902. The California Evidence Code does not contain this limitation,
and if we can address the testimonial aspect of the Confrontation Clause problem, the evidence
could be admitted in California courts.
191. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321–22 (2009).
192. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–60 (2004); see also Jay M. Tiftickjian &
Timothy Bussey, Unraveling the Confrontation Clause: Expert Testimony and Forensic Reports
after Williams v. Illinois, in UTILIZING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (Aspatore 2014),
2013 WL 5757942, at *5.
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appropriate mechanism for admitting the forensic report for the truth of
the matter asserted? If so, the analysis would need to leave open the
Confrontation Clause issue on the grounds that the report was not
intended to substitute for trial testimony. It is being used as such only
because the witness no longer can recall accurately and completely
enough to testify fully and truthfully in the matter and, therefore, this
substitute testimony is the next best thing. Would that person need to
appear as a witness? In federal courts, the answer is “no” because
availability is immaterial under Federal Rule of Evidence 803, despite
the fact that the language of Rule 803(5) refers to a “witness.”193 This
mode of analysis may provide a clearer path for the courts because the
document could be read into evidence by the offering party (the
prosecution), but can be admitted into evidence only by the opposing
party (the defense).194
D. Providing Special Instructions for Jury Trials
The fourth option supplements jury instructions in cases where
experts rely upon other experts, or where there are different testing and
testifying experts. Whether the case involves a judge trial or a jury trial
has important implications because there is a greater risk of confusion
with declining to state the underlying basis of evidence that contains
inadmissible hearsay or testimonial statements when the jury is
supposed to evaluate the credibility and weight of the expert’s opinion
testimony. The trial court and jurors hearing the evidence made known
to the expert or the hypothetical upon which the opinion is based is very
different from withholding otherwise inadmissible evidence from the
jury when the expert is using that evidence as the basis for her opinion.
One issue to consider here is whether or not the report of the nontestifying expert or scientific analyst was admitted into evidence. When
that report is admitted into evidence it can be hearsay unless offered for
193. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
Recorded Recollection. A record that: (A) is on a matter the witness once knew about
but now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and accurately; (B) was made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory; and (C)
accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge. If admitted, the record may be read into
evidence but may be received as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.
Id. But see CAL. EVID. CODE 1237 (“Past recollection recorded”). The California rule requires a
witness to testify that a report is accurate where evidence of a statement previously made by a
witness out of court is allowed, if the statement would have been admissible if the witness had
made it while testifying; the statement concerns a matter which the witness now does not
remember well enough to testify about fully and accurately; and the statement is in a writing that
was made when the events recorded in the writing had occurred or were fresh in the witness’
memory. Id.
194. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
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a non-truth purpose. On the other hand, when the report is not admitted
into evidence, then courts address the issue of surrogacy or parroting,
and many courts have found the report to be inadmissible unless there is
evidence of an independent conclusion drawn by the testifying
expert.195 Also, when the report is not admitted into evidence, there is
more risk of juror confusion as to the underlying basis evidence for the
expert testimony because the jurors hear about the report, but do not
ever see or read it.
Circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt enhances this risk of
juror confusion because it requires inferences to be made about how the
evidence establishes guilt. One author suggests that the next case taken
by the Supreme Court must be one that involves a jury trial because
there is more danger depending upon the impact of limiting instructions
on jurors.196 Most of the cases submitting petitions for certiorari
involved jury trials, as did the Clark case. Clark, however, rejected the
argument that one mode of analysis should be whether the jury would
consider the out-of-court statement to be the equivalent of, or a
substitute for, testimony.197
This dilemma is demonstrated in cases involving DNA evidence,
which provides a percentage of likelihood that the defendant’s DNA
matches the DNA that was found at the crime scene. In these cases, the
jury still must draw an inference from the fact that if they believe the
match is accurate, then the prosecution has proven that the defendant
was at the crime scene. However, without further inferences, the
defendant’s presence at the crime scene does not establish the
defendant’s guilt. The use of DNA may be a closer—but nonetheless
circumstantial—link in cases of rape where the issue is lack of consent
as opposed to identity of the assailant. But in other cases where the
identity of the assailant is at issue—rather than whether or not the other
elements of the crime were met—the jury’s ability or willingness to
195. See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct 2705, 2710–16 (2011) (rejecting the
admission of surrogate testimony, where the report was not admitted into evidence, because the
testifying analyst had no first-hand knowledge regarding the completed tests and had no
independent opinion concerning the defendant’s blood-alcohol content).
196. See Toney, supra note 70, at 997.
On that score, this article argues that the Supreme Court should only grant certiorari if
the case below is tried to a jury. This article takes that position primarily because the
justices would likely remain divided if the finder-of-fact below were a judge. In that
trial, if similarly offensive statements were elicited, the plurality could simply
regurgitate its argument from Williams: no matter how garbled the expert’s delivery is,
a trial judge is presumed to adhere to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and those rules do
not permit the introduction of basis evidence for its truth.
Id. (citing Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2235–37 (2012)).
197. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2183 (2015)
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follow the limiting instruction is of crucial importance in safeguarding
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT REMAINS?
Given the circuit splits on what counts as testimonial evidence in the
areas of autopsy reports, machine-generated data, identifying
substances, samples, and DNA profile evidence, this Article has three
proposals that would clarify Confrontation Clause jurisprudence: (1) to
treat quasi-percipient expert witnesses differently than other experts; (2)
to consider certain percipient portions of expert reports and other types
of statements not testimonial, thus allowing traditional hearsay
exceptions to be adequate for admission; and (3) to provide specifically
tailored instructions for jury trials involving nondisclosure of expert
basis evidence. More remains to be done, and as long as the Supreme
Court continues to decline petitions that provide opportunities to clarify
the scope and parameters of the right to confrontation, this Article
provides some guidance for lower courts.

